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Post Hurricane Katrina-Rita Planning, Recovery and Resiliency
New Orleans, Louisiana 2005-2011: Faith + Fortitude + Plans = Resurrection
James R. Amdal
University of New Orleans Transportation Institute
jamdal@uno.edu
Pierce Lewis, a world renowned geographer and author, famously described New
Orleans as “The Impossible but Inevitable City”1. The storms of 2005 emphatically
proved his point. In the ensuing years, New Orleans has proved its resiliency as a
city and as a people. Today, it is back after overcoming seemingly insurmountable
odds. Some say the city is better than before. That is for history to decide, but the
post-Katrina / Rita recovery of New Orleans is a long and drawn out tale of trial,
tribulation and, ultimately, triumph. This is my personal account of the rebirth of
New Orleans’ as a work in progress.
As a resident of New Orleans for the past 30 years, a Katrina evacuee, a member of
multiple post-disaster recovery planning teams, as well as the long serving
Chairman of the Central Business District Historic Districts Landmark Commission, I
have a unique perspective on these storms and the resultant planning processes
that were used in the city’s recovery. I also have first-hand experience with both
processes and projects that have become central to New Orleans’ recovery during
our post-disaster reconstruction.
Since the focus of this paper is urban resiliency, I will discuss its role both in our
history and in our recent recovery. I will conclude with a brief overview of New
Orleans in late 2011. I will also answer the following questions in the context of our
continuing saga: How did New Orleans originally use resiliency as it grew and
developed? How did the 2005 Hurricanes affect Louisiana and New Orleans? How
did the country, the state and the city respond to the massive destruction? How was
resiliency incorporated into the plans for NO’s reconstruction and repopulation?
What lessons have we learned in the intervening years?
Given our unique geography, on a deltaic plain next to the Mississippi River, with
low elevations and in a flood-prone area, citizens of New Orleans originally built
raised buildings on “high ground” in anticipation of annual floods. Low lying areas of
the city were avoided until the later part of the 1800s. This is an early example of
our forefathers’ appreciation of urban resiliency: they built appropriate buildings in
appropriate places.
Soon after New Orleans was founded in 1718, owners of upriver plantations,
citizens of small river towns, as well as residents of New Orleans started building
earthen levees along the banks of the Mississippi River to protect themselves and
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their property from the river’s annual floods. These earthen levees offered little
protection from hurricanes and were overtopped or breached during periods of
high water, but they did offer some protection under normal river conditions. These
primitive forms of flood protection, although strengthened and raised over the
years, still retain their vital function today, although their stability remains a worry
to some.
Starting in the late 1890’s things in New Orleans began to change in a rather
remarkable manner. The Sewerage and Water Board of the City of New Orleans
(SWB) began constructing a world-renowned drainage system using massive pumps
(the patented Woods Screw Pumps were used worldwide but they were invented by
a SWB engineer in the early 1900s), pump stations and outfall canals to drain the
city and “dewater” it’s low lands to increase the city’s buildable area. This was the
first large scale attempt to “beat Mother Nature” in New Orleans, but it would not be
the last.

A Baldwin Woods under a Woods Screw Pump
Image source: www.nola.com
In large part, before technology “triumphed Mother Nature”, our forefathers got it
right. They built where the city was most naturally resilient, on our naturally high
ground. An 1878 map by Civil Engineer T. S. Hardee shows the City of New Orleans
with 200,000 residents confined to the “Sliver on the River”. This area suffered only
minor flooding from Katrina. Areas labeled “cypress swamp” on this and earlier
maps include present day neighborhoods including Lakeview, most of Gentilly, NO
East, Broadmoor and the Lower 9. During Katrina, these neighborhoods received the
worst flooding given their naturally low elevations. Note that the unflooded areas on
the post-Katrina map are almost identical to the populated areas of New Orleans on
the 1878 map. Our historic neighborhoods and their flood conscious architecture
played a major part in New Orleans’ resiliency because they weathered the storm
with minimal damage. They were the first areas to repopulate and today have the
highest real estate values. Pre-Katrina, the real estate maxim was “LocationLocation-Location”. Immediately after Katrina it became “Elevation-ElevationElevation.”

1878 Map of New Orleans: T. S. Hardee
Image Source: Louisiana State Museum

After Hurricane Betsy devastated New Orleans as a Category 4 storm in 1965, the US
Army Corps of Engineers was directed by Congress to build an extensive flood
protection system around New Orleans. This system was comprised of higher and
stronger earthen levees and massive concrete floodwalls. Unfortunately this flood
protection system was still not complete when Katrina hit New Orleans in 2005 and
is still incomplete today, although it is almost finished. With these manmade
interventions, citizens in New Orleans assumed they were safe and secure… until
the flaws of this system were tragically revealed by Katrina’s floodwaters.
So what was Hurricane Katrina? First, it was a
massive Category 3 storm with winds in excess
of 125 mph. Katrina impacted the entire
Central Gulf Coast: Louisiana, Mississippi,
Alabama and Florida; not just New Orleans and
southern LA. While the Mississippi Gulf Coast
was especially hard hit by Katrina’s winds and
30’ storm surges, 80% of New Orleans flooded
from breaches in our federally designed and
constructed flood protection system. All

The Twin Spans over Lake Pontchartrain
Image Source: gatewayno.com

utilities and telecommunications systems failed. All surface transportation systems
were flooded. These systems were basically impassable for months and some were
completely destroyed: i.e. the Twin Spans bridge over Lake Pontchartrain.
However, the Port of New Orleans reopened after 13 days, thanks to access
provided by the Mississippi River. Katrina became the most destructive and costliest
natural / manmade disaster in the history of the US due to its immense size and its
destructive storm surges.
But for New Orleans, Katrina was both a natural and manmade disaster. It was just
made worse by our natural topography and our protection systems. New Orleans is
a natural bowl ringed at its edges by either earthen levees or floodwalls. Roughly
50% of the greater NO region is below sea level.

Image Source: www.nola.com

The map shown
below indicates with
the dark blue arrows
where the levees
were breached (50
sites total) during
Katrina. The city’s
naturally low
elevation and the
failed flood
protection system
was a fatal
combination. The
red areas on the map
indicate the
locations where
deaths occurred. A
computer generated
simulation of the
Katrina flooding in
the New Orleans
region is available
at: www.nola.com/
katrina/graphics/
flashflood.swf.

Hurricane Rita hit just 3 weeks later, with winds estimated at 120 mph. It caused
more coastal erosion, a second evacuation for impacted areas, localized flooding and
additional structural failures. While Rita’s impact was most severe in southwestern
LA and Texas, New Orleans still suffered surges in excess of 8 ft. and breaches
occurred in some provisionally-repaired levees. These failures caused a second
flood (2’-3’) in certain neighborhoods. Rita added “insult to injury” in a horrific
replay of Katrina for New Orleans.

Horrifying images of Katrina’s destruction in New Orleans and along the Gulf Coast
were broadcast via cable networks and television in late August and early
September, 2005. However, today, the enormity of these storms and their
destructive powers is still hard to imagine. By most recent accounts, these storms in
combination caused over $200B in losses and 1,800 deaths; 200,000 homes and
18,000 businesses were destroyed; some parishes were 100% destroyed; 19 of 64
parishes in LA were severely affected. LA lost over 100 square miles of coastal
wetlands, a 50 yr. natural equivalent. New Orleans sustained 57% of LA’s total loss.
Access to New Orleans was severely restricted for 5 weeks. Most importantly,
roughly 100,000 residents have not yet returned to New Orleans. Six years later, the
images and statistics are still shocking. In some areas of New Orleans evidence of
the storm’s damage remains today.
Given the devastation to the city and to Louisiana as a whole, what did we do to
respond? Gov. Kathleen Blanco created the Louisiana Recovery Authority (LRA) in
mid-October, 2005. The LRA became key to the state’s and city’s recovery because it
was designated as the administrator of all federal recovery funds ($10.4B) allocated
to Louisiana by the US Congress. The distribution of these monies was dependent on
individual recovery plans submitted by all 19 affected parishes. In both Louisiana
and in New Orleans, creating a comprehensive and inclusive recovery plan became a
long and difficult process. This was, in part, due to a strong sense of being rooted to
the history, the culture and the communities of the state and the neighborhoods in
New Orleans. This unique characteristic was common in citizens that were
devastated by Katrina, Rita or both. This “rootedness” often clashed with recovery
planning processes that attempted to limit the areas that would be repopulated.
Almost simultaneously, in New Orleans, Mayor C. Ray Nagin created Bring New
Orleans Back (BNOB), a 17 member committee of city leaders, to respond to the
devastation and deliver a city-wide Recovery Plan within 90 days. This was the first
impossible deadline imposed on the planning process. It was unfortunately not the
last.

Image Source: Amdal 2006

In order to maximize citizen input,
BNOB was organized into committees
and subcommittees. They included:
Land Use; Infrastructure (flood
protection, public transit, criminal
justice); Culture; Education; Health and
Human Services; Economic
Development; Government
Effectiveness. These committees held
hundreds of individual meetings over a
3 month period. In my opinion, this was
the beginning of an “illness” that befell
thousands in New Orleans. I call it
“planningitis”.

Citizens felt obligated to attend hundreds, if not thousands, of meetings citywide or
in their individual neighborhoods regarding recovery and post-disaster rebuilding.
In some neighborhoods these meetings continue today.
However, significant projects resulted from these early BNOB meetings and the
resultant recovery plans which grew from them. As a result of BNOB and its citizens
input, pump stations were moved to the lakefront and the Mississippi River Gulf
Outlet (a 1960’s era manmade shipping shortcut to the Gulf of Mexico) was closed.
Equally important, the Corps of Engineers strengthened our levees and floodwalls,
installed surge protecting floodgates at the lakefront, and are now in the final stages
of completing the federally mandated Flood Protection System. All of these
decisions were made to address the city’s resilience to future storms.
Soon after the formation of the LRA and BNOB, the Urban Land Institute (ULI), a
Washington DC Not –For-Profit was invited to New Orleans to brainstorm with
community, business, and academic leaders on the future of New Orleans. The ULI
team was composed of professionals from both the public and private sector
including planners, landscape architects, mayors, developers, finance experts and
public administrators. After a week of analyzing New Orleans’ situation, the ULI
team prepared a Recovery Plan based on their cumulative experience and expertise.
Their recommendations included: shrinking the city’s footprint; strategically
planning for a reduced population; converting heavily damaged neighborhoods into
open space. They were the first group to suggest that neighborhoods needed to
prove their validity in order to participate in the city’s recovery efforts. They also
suggested a four month moratorium on issuing building permits.
All of these ideas encompassed various aspects of “resiliency”: i.e. to prevent the
repopulation of the areas most at risk. Although reasonable and professionally
sound, ULI’s concepts created confusion, fear, and abject rejection due to their
implied impacts. Most of their recommendations were flatly and vocally rejected.
Their plan and its recommendations also raised thorny tangential issues: the rights
of property owners remained unanswered; the rootedness of many neighborhoods
was ignored; the idea of replacing residential properties with green space /
retention ponds. This plan also seemed to pit one neighborhood against another.
Citizens asked: What is a viable neighborhood? According to whose standards? Who
decides? These were all valid questions with no answers, at least at the time.
Due to political realities, most of the ULI recommendations were rejected almost
immediately by the Mayor. He chose instead to adopt a market-driven approach to
redevelopment and repopulation. With this decision, the idea of imposing terms and
conditions on redevelopment and repopulation was dropped from civic discourse.
But the community knew what citizens could do on their own. Almost immediately
after returning to New Orleans, citizens realized that they could provide immediate
help to the city in a multitude of ways. This was and continues to be an important
part of the city’s resiliency: its people and the diverse roles they have played in the
city’s recovery and resurrection can’t be over emphasized.
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The Katrina Krewe, a
knockoff of Mardi Gras
terminology, voluntarily
cleaned the streets, parks,
and medians throughout
the city. Civic volunteerism,
from locals as well as
volunteer groups from
around the US and abroad,
became a necessary
response to the scale of the
damage and pace of the
government’s response at
all levels. Citizens pitched in
where necessary to
enhance or accelerate
efforts being made by the
city, private contractors,
the National Guard and
others.

Non-Governmental Organizations (i.e. Habitat for Humanity; Global Green and
countless others) came to New Orleans to spearhead individual projects. The
Musicians Village in the Upper 9th Ward is just one example of their lasting
contribution. This project is now occupied as permanent housing and recently
opened the Ellis Marsalis Center for Music as a multi-purpose arts facility.

Image Source: Amdal 2007

When the final BNOB Report was released in January 2006, the citizens reacted with
“Fear and Loathing”. In response, Recovery Steering Committees were formed in
most, if not all, neighborhoods. They were grouped into planning districts based on
pre-Katrina designations made by the City Planning Commission. Their primary
mission was to prove their neighborhood’s viability and value. The net result of the
BNOB plan was a renewed sense of worth and purpose for neighborhood
organizations city-wide. But they also realized they needed professional help to
develop “credible” recovery plans. And at that time, no one knew how that help was
going to be provided. During deliberations with FEMA in early 2006, it was
determined that FEMA funding could not be used for recovery planning.

Image Source: www.nola.com

So, with this decision, a major question remained unanswered. Who would provide
the needed professional resources to develop individual neighborhood recovery
plans and how would they get paid? Paul Lambert, a Miami based housing expert
under contract to the New Orleans City Council, came up with the answers. He had
past experience in recovery efforts in Dade County Florida after Hurricane Andrew
hit Miami in 1992. He knew that unspent CDBG funds were available for recovery
planning in the “wet” neighborhoods of New Orleans, just as they were used in
Florida. “Dry” neighborhoods were ineligible. He formed a team of local and national
professionals and they began work in early 2006 on the 46 “wet” neighborhoods
using CDBG funds. The areas shown with black borders were included in the “wet”
neighborhoods.
The principal
planner responsible
for what became
known as the
Lambert Plan was
my friend, Alfredo
Sanchez with
Miami-based
Bermello Ajamil &
Partners. He and I
worked with the
District 5 Recovery
Steering Committee
and citizen
advocates on their
Neighborhood
Rebuilding Plan for
most of 2006. I
originally
volunteered to
assist the District 5
Recovery Steering
Committee before
the Lambert Plan
was even
underway.
Image Source: City of New Orleans Neighborhood Rebuilding Plan report

This collection of neighborhoods is located immediately city-side of the infamous
17th Street drainage canal, which ruptured during Katrina. This area flooded with
over 10 feet of water and many homes were filled with 6 feet of mud and debris.
District 5 (light olive color in map’s upper left) was basically wiped out.

Today these neighborhoods (7 in total) are roughly 70% to 90% repopulated with
both newly built or rehabbed houses. Harrison Avenue, District 5’s commercial
corridor, is now thriving. Hynes Elementary School is in the final stages of
completion as a new facility on its original site. But this has only happened after
years of dedicated work by citizen activists, strong neighborhood organizations, and
significant leadership provided by numerous religious institutions and their
affiliated schools. The importance of the religious community of all faiths cannot be
over emphasized.
The individual neighborhood organizations joined together to form the District 5
Recovery Steering Committee while the Mayor created the BNOB and the Governor
created the LRA. The District 5 Recovery Steering Committee created over 72
different categories for citizen involvement. Meeting at least once every two weeks
for a period of several months, these committees added important citizen input into
the overall planning process. However, this highly regimented organization, its
member organizations’ collective history of advocacy as well as their relative
affluence were the keys to District 5’s recovery. Their track record made a real
difference when it came time for civic mobilization and political action.

Image Source: St. Dominics
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The Lambert Plan incorporated 48 individual neighborhood rebuilding plans and
was published as a 1200 page (11” x 17” color printed both sides) document. The
total costs for its implementation were estimated at $4.4B. Its projects were
prioritized based on when they should be implemented. This plan represented an
incredible effort on the part of the respective neighborhood leaders, citizens, as well
as the planning team to devise a recovery / rebuilding plan for the flooded parts of
the city. However, the Lambert Plan did not and could not address those
neighborhoods that did not flood since they were not “distressed” as defined by
federal regulations. Therefore it could not be used as the city’s Recovery Plan to
access funds from the LRA. Thus, the Unified New Orleans Plan (UNOP) was born.

So what was the Unified New Orleans Plan? It was a privately financed planning
process that attempted to divorce the planning process from “politics as usual”. In
reality it just replaced one form of politics with another. UNOP included all
neighborhoods in the city, both wet and dry, and sought to incorporate all previous
plans into its process and product. These included the BNOB, Lambert
Neighborhood Rebuilding Plans as well as independent recovery plans created by
third party advocates, as well as LA Speaks, the state’s recovery plan. Therefore, it
could, and eventually was, used by the City to access recovery monies from the LRA.

Image Source: UNOP

Why did it succeed? In large part, UNOP’s Community Congresses were the key to
its success. There were three, each was an eight hour session held on a Saturday.
Thousands of citizens participated via hi-tech communication with each other and
the Congress facilitators during these meetings. An interactive technique helped
convince the LRA that UNOP was the city’s recovery plan, based on input from
residents and those still in the diaspora. Citizens participated, regardless of where
they were living at the time, and reached consensus on goals, objectives, policies and
projects. This was UNOP’s most important contribution.

Image Source: UNOP

UNOP analyzed city-wide systems as well as all 72 individual neighborhoods with a
particular emphasis on risk management. This map illustrates the depth of flooding
within the City as established by aerial photography. As you can clearly see, the
“sliver on the river” was spared most of the flooding.

Image Source: www.katrina.esl.lsu.edu

UNOP also attempted to forecast repopulation using a variety of indicators: utility
hookups, mail deliveries, permit activity by classification, etc... This proved to be
very problematic and unreasonable, in the end. However, it was one way of
approaching an uncertain future.

Image Source: UNOP

UNOP also made city-wide assessments of systems and selected both projects and
programs to be included in its final list of recommendations. These were broadly
prioritized in time (immediate, mid-term, long-term) as they had been in previous
recovery and rebuilding plans. But it was the community engagement process, not
the product, that sold UNOP to the people of New Orleans, the elected and
appointed officials. The costs associated with UNOP’s policies and programs were in
excess of $14B, given its incorporation of all neighborhoods in the city and their
individual needs.
A significant part of UNOP was its planning for the “dry” neighborhoods. In
approaching these particular neighborhoods, it became clear that their damage was
economic, not physical. I served on the District 1 Recovery Steering Committee
which incorporated both the Central Business District and the French Quarter.
When these two distinctly different neighborhoods were combined as District 1 and
began meeting, they soon realized that they shared a common challenge: the
perception that New Orleans was a continuing disaster with no future. This meant
severely reduced visitor numbers (tourists and conventioneers) and an extremely
altered economy. However, by working together, their individual interests were
joined in mutually reinforcing plans, programs and projects that benefitted both
neighborhoods as well as the city. These included multiple marketing and
promotional campaigns by New Orleans, the State of Louisiana, the Visitors and
Convention Bureau and many others. Their overall goal was to restore tourism so
that our economy could recover and grow. Individually and collectively these efforts
were very successful. As just one indicator, there are now 300 more restaurants
operating in New Orleans than before Katrina.

Image Source: UNOP

For District 1, UNOP proposed a concentration of performing arts venues at a prime
intersection in the CBD. “Broadway South” is now being realized at the upper end of
Canal Street, the traditional commercial corridor in the CBD. The 1927 Saenger
Theater, an entertainment icon for the City, is being renovated to recapture its
historic past while employing cutting edge technologies for the performing arts.
Across the street, the 1947 Joy Theater is also being renovated for live
performances. A new $70 mixed use development, primarily residential, has also
just been approved by the City Council and groundbreaking will begin this year. All
of this development has only begun in the last twenty four months.

Image Source: Amdal 2010

UNOP’s District 1 plan also envisioned specific nodes of development and particular
characteristics per project. A part of bio-medical research / bio-technology sector
was recently realized with the opening of the Bio-Innovation Center, a $60M
incubator for research and development in the medical sciences. Also included in
this emerging economic sector is a new Health Sciences Center that includes a new
LSU Teaching Hospital and a new VA Hospital, currently being built at a cost of $2B
in portions of Mid-City, a neighborhood just lakeside of the CBD. These new
hospitals have been a source of heated debate for the last several years in the
community at-large but are now under construction.

Image Source: Southeast Louisiana Veterans

Although UNOP was expansive in its scale and cost, remarkably much of it is now
being realized. On just one upper CBD corridor, a new $45M streetcar line is being
built, with 100% federal funds, while within 3 blocks of its route over $1.3B of new
development has been planned or built since Katrina. These include a newly
renovated Superdome, the soon to be reopened Hyatt Regency Hotel, the Benson
Tower and the Saratoga Apartments, a 1950s office building being converted to 150
units of downtown rental housing. The CBD’s first grocery store opened in midOctober, 2011. Most of these projects have only happened in the last couple of years.

Image Source: Amdal 2010

I began documenting New Orleans’ recovery planning process in the spring of 2007,
when Professor Isabel Maret of the University of Montreal and her French associates
Phillipe Jamet, of the French Embassy in Washington and Professor Frederique
Vincent of ISIGE brought 20 graduate students in municipal engineering to visit New
Orleans post-Katrina. At that time, Bob Hebert, a columnist for the NYT’s, noted that
New Orleans was like the fairy tale character Humpty Dumpty who fell off the wall
and nobody knew how to put him back together again. At the time, his assessment
about the city was correct “A great American cultural center like New Orleans was
all but washed away, and no one knows how to put it back together again.” (Bob
Herbert, NYT 2/22/07). I’m glad to report we have figured a lot out in the last 4
years.
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Within the Central Business District and the French Quarter traditional
development patterns have been augmented by new centers of investment activity.
The Superdome and its immediate environs are seeing over $800M invested in
renovations and new construction within a 4 block radius. The Convention Center

and the Central Area Riverfront are also seeing additions to their traditional
offerings: a new cruise ship terminal, expanded convention facilities and extensive
renovations to Riverwalk, a specialty retail center overlooking the Mississippi River.
The French Quarter is thriving within its historic context and “toute ensemble”.
However, the Lower 9 is still struggling after 6 years of planning, advocacy, and
major investments by foundations and support organizations. The Make It Right
Foundation is in the process of building 150 environmentally friendly homes in the
Lower 9 which was basically destroyed by Katrina’s floodwaters. The new houses
are elevated 8 feet and feature Energy-Star windows and appliances, formaldehydefree cabinets and paints free of VOCs. The ultimate success of this initiative is still up
in the air in spite of its laudable intent and significant investment. Retail and
institutional anchors have been slow to reemerge after the storm however, it was
recently announced that a new 25,000 square foot grocery would be built in the
neighborhood to serve area residents.

Image Source: makeitrightnola.org

Treme, a historic neighborhood founded by “free men of color” in the 1840s, is
hoping the redevelopment of the Claiborne elevated highway (I-10) into a grade
level boulevard will help restore the once thriving Claiborne Avenue mixed use
corridor. This is a direct outgrowth of both plans, however, at this time, the project
remains a vision, not a reality.

Image Source: nola.com

The Regional Planning Commission, the Metropolitan Planning Organization for the
New Orleans region, in partnership with the LA Department of Transportation and
Development and the Federal Highway Administration created the Submerged
Roads Program to specifically fund the repair New Orleans’ major arterial roadways
post-flood. Before the storm, local roads were not great but after the flood they were
horrible. They also were deteriorating at an alarming rate, due to the influx of salt
water with the flooding. This program has been able to repair over 56 miles of
roadways in the city and significantly add to the local bike path system by
specifically designating bike routes within the newly reconstructed roadways.
Finally, the Submerged Roads Program could not address the needs of the interior
roadways; i.e. the streets of the neighborhoods. How these repairs will be funded
remains another unanswered question.

Image Source: Regional Planning Commission
Attention has also been given to expanding options for mobility with a special
emphasis on improving and enlarging alternative transportation systems:
specifically for pedestrians, the mobility impaired and cyclists of all types and ages.
Through a coordinated plan that addresses multiple needs throughout the city,
we’ve grown our bicycle network from a meager 5 miles in 2004 to over 40 miles in
2011. From 2010 to 2011 bicycle use increased 20%. The network includes bike
lanes within roadways, sharrows as well as bike trails. In the coming months we will
begin the construction of the Lafitte Greenway. This 3.1 mile project is converting an
abandoned freight rail right-of-way into a multi-functional linear green space that
will accommodate a variety of users: from toddlers to the elderly. Walkers, cyclists,
skateboarders, rollerblade aficionados as well as young families with strollers will
use this new amenity. This project, long a dream for a core constituency, is now
being heralded as the ultimate urban renaissance: turning an abandoned industrial

eyesore into a community asset. When complete it will serve multiple
neighborhoods along its path, from the French Quarter to Bayou St. John in Mid-City.

Image Source:

Billy Fields, PhD Assistant Professor Texas State University
New Orleans Active Transportation Symposium

On another front, after the floods, elevating houses became a new “art” form,
especially in neighborhoods that were built after WWII in newly developed areas
within the city. These houses were typically “slab on grade” and present costly
challenges for the homeowner and has created some visually disturbing results in
many instances. The original elevation program provided up to $30K per residence
for “house raising”. This amount was recently found to be inadequate and was
amended upwards to provide residents with the funds necessary to properly raise
their homes. Another problem with this program was its timing. The original “Road
Home” program that provided funds for rehab or reconstruction of damaged homes
was awarded several years before the elevation program was activated. This
complicated the entire rehab / reconstruction funding decision for homeowners.
Equally troubling, abuses are now being reported of unqualified contractors being
hired for these projects. Although paid through state administered programs, fraud
claims are common and becoming more so. Finally, there are no design standards
for ‘house raising” which can lead to unintended consequences. Many individual
homes look slightly “out of place” in the context of neighboring houses and the
overall streetscape.

Image Source: Amdal 2011

Since Katrina, the USACOE (the Corps.) has spent over $14B upgrading, repairing
and completing the New Orleans area storm protection system. This was and
remains our most important resiliency component. One major project is the surge
protection barrier recently built in Lake Borne at a cost of $1.1 B. When complete in
2012, the projects undertaken by the Corps will provide protection for a CAT 3
storm for the greater New Orleans region. However, many believe this system
should offer protection from a CAT 5 storm but the costs are astronomical and
currently this upgrade is not being pursued. These flood protection projects, as well
as the rest of our recovery activities, have shielded the New Orleans region, in large
part, from the economic ills currently afflicting the United States. We became an
isolated bubble of reconstruction activity recovering from the storms of 2005.
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Relative to public education, by 2016, every public school student in New Orleans
will be attending a new or renovated school, designed and constructed with
resilience as a core requirement. This $2B rebuilding program is being administered
by the Recovery School District, a state agency that replaced the highly politicized
pre-Katrina Orleans School Board. An alternate program of charter schools, largely
administered by parents and teachers, has proven extremely successful in postKatrina New Orleans, to the delight of local and national advocates. Fully 78% of
today’s public school students are being educated in a charter school, making New
Orleans a model for national public education reform.

Public housing has also been transformed post-Katrina into mixed income
developments by an aggressive partnership between the Department of Housing
and Urban Development, the Housing Authority of New Orleans and a number of
local and national private sector developers. Before Katrina, more than 5,000
families lived in public housing, but today only one-third have returned to the newly
built replacements. Former residents have mixed emotions about their new
“neighborhoods” with some decrying the higher rents and utility bills. Others miss
their former neighbors who have not returned. It remains to be seen if this “new
model” of public housing will fare better than those they replaced. Only time will
tell.
Post-Katrina, New Orleans has become a hot spot for young entrepreneurs. Many
were first drawn to the city by the disaster, but once becoming part of the
community, many have stayed and prospered. As a colleague noted during a UNOP
District 1 Recovery Steering Committee Meeting, “these folks can be anywhere.”
Their businesses are lap-top based, but they’ve chosen New Orleans due its limitless
opportunities for growth and development. The Idea Village, a local Not- For-Profit
founded in 2000, has emerged post-Katrina as a nexus for entrepreneurial
initiatives.
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Despite our post-storm recovery, long-standing problems still persist in New
Orleans. Crime remains an on-going problem for residents and visitors alike. There
exists today in the city over 48,000 blighted and/or vacant properties, both
structures and lots, according to figures recently released by the Greater New
Orleans Community Data Center. New Orleans ranks #2 in the US for income
disparity and the 2010 British Petroleum deep-water oil spill is still affecting the
local and state’s economy.
The post-Katrina recovery of New Orleans presents a unique opportunity for others
to learn from our successes and failures. Today New Orleans may be the best

laboratory in the world for academic and applied research in the ever-expanding
disciplines of disaster recovery and urban resilience. There exist countless avenues
of investigation: from public health to economic revitalization. New Orleans has
demonstrated success, in spite of overwhelming odds, in neighborhoods throughout
the city. Each offers a unique perspective on disaster recovery at many levels:: the
individual citizen, the neighborhood leader, and city, state or national policymakers.
Resilience has many different faces in post-Katrina New Orleans: the physical, the
social, the historic and the organizational. The city has excelled in each of these
arenas: in some more than others, but all have been successful. New Orleans over
the last six years has been revisioned, rebuilt and resurrected from the floodwaters
of 2005. Post-Katrina New Orleans clearly has much to offer the international
community in understanding and learning from our efforts in disaster recovery and
urban resilience.

